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Jesse Alama Some problems with two
axiomatizations of discussive logic
Abstract. Problems in two axiomatizations of Jas´kowski’s discussive (or discursive) logic
D2 are considered. A recent axiomatization of D2 and completeness proof relative to D2’s
intended semantics seems to be mistaken because some formulas valid according to the
intended semantics turn out to be unprovable. Although no new axiomatization is offered,
nor a repaired completeness proof given, the shortcomings identified here may be a step
toward an improved axiomatization.
Keywords: discussive logic, discursive logic, modal logic, automated theorem proving,
countermodel, matrices
Introduction
Jas´kowski’s discussive (or discursive) logic is a paraconsistent logic of opin-
ions. The idea is that it is one thing is a reasoner contradicts himself; it is
quite another for two reasoners to contradict one another. The latter is an
everyday phenomenon that is all too familiar, but difficult to justify from the
standard logical standpoint, which accepts “explosion principles” such as ex
contradictione quodlibet ((p ∧ ∼ p)→ q. The idea is that an opinion, on its
own, is to be understood as consistent (in the logical sense of the term), but
might conflict with other opinions. It is one thing if a speaker contradicts
himself; it is another if two speakers hold conflicting opinions. We recognize
the former as leading to a kind of incoherence; the latter is not necessarily
incoherent, but perhaps calls for resolution of conflict.
Jas´kowski did not offer an axiomatization of his new logic. His contribu-
tion was to formulate the problem of giving a rigorous account of a certain
paraconsistent discursive phenomenon. He spent much of his attention on
a discussion of the notion of paraconsistency and its justification from the
standard non-paraconsistent point of view. Axiomatizations came later.
In a recent paper [2], Ciuciura takes issue with an axiomatization, D
(due to da Costa, Dubikajtis, and Kotas [1, 4, 3]) of D2. He points out
two axioms of D that are not valid in the intended semantics of D2. To
repair the difficulties, Ciuciura gave a new axiomatization, C, of D2 and
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proved soundness and completeness of the new axiomatization relative to
the standard semantics of D2, which is based on the modal logic S5.
Although D apparently does go beyond the intention of D2 (that is,
there are theorems of D that are not valid in the intended semantics of D2),
Ciuciura’s proposed fix for the problem (that is, the replacement of D by the
new axiom system C) is itself problematic. Namely, there are theses in the
language of D2 that are valid according to the intended semantics but are
not theorems of C. A consequence of this is that Ciuciura’s completeness
proof is somehow flawed.
In Section 1 the two axiomatizations C of Ciuciura and D of da Costa,
Dubikajtis, and Kotas are presented. Section 2 treats the non-equivalence
of C and D. Ciuciura pointed out two axioms of D that fail in the in-
tended semantics of D2. Although even one such example suffices to make
his point, we complete the discussion by pointing out even more axioms of
D, not mentioned by Ciuciura, that are likewise invalid. One might get the
impression from Ciuciura’s criticism that D merely ‘overshoots’ the intended
semantics and can be repaired by simply dropping some axioms. We find,
though, that C is not simply a restriction of D: there are axioms of C that
are not theorems of D. We are left in a rather puzzling situation: C and D
are “orthogonal” in the sense that they overlap one another, but each has
theorems that are not found in the other. Moreover, we find that there are
some D2-valid formulas unprovable in D. It would appear that the problem
of axiomatizing D2 remains unsolved.
1. Dueling axiomatizations
For the sake of completeness, below are two axiomatizations in the language
∼ (negation), ∨ (disjunction), →d (discussive implication), and ∧d (discus-
sive conjunction). The first batch is due to da Costa, Dubikajtis, and Kotas
and is, for short, called simply “D”; the second batch is due to Ciuciura and
is called “C”. Both C and D use modus ponens (for discussive implication)
as their sole rule of inference. The axiom lists are simply repeated from [2]
(to more clearly distinguish the two axiom systems, we use the “C” and “D”
prefixes, whereas Ciuciura used the prefix “A” for both sets of axioms). The
axiom sets are given schematically; Greek letters are variables ranging over
formulas.
D1 α→d (β →d α)
D2 (α→d (β →d γ))→d ((α→d β)→d (α→d γ))
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D3 ((α→d β)→d α)→d α
D4 (α ∧d β)→d α
D5 (α ∧d β)→d β
D6 α→d (β →d (α ∧d β))
D7 α→d (α ∨ β)
D8 β →d (α ∨ β)
D9 (α→d γ)→d ((β →d γ)→d (α ∨ β)→d γ)
D10 α→d ∼∼α
D11 ∼∼α→d α
D12 ∼ (α ∨ ∼α)→d β
D13 ∼ (α ∨ β)→d ∼ (β ∨ α)
D14 ∼ (α ∨ β)→d (∼β ∧d ∼α)
D15 ∼ (∼∼α ∨ β)→d ∼ (α ∨ β)
D16 (∼ (α ∨ β)→d γ)→d ((∼α→d β) ∨ γ)
D17 ∼ ((α ∨ β) ∨ γ)→d ∼ (α ∨ (β ∨ γ))
D18 ∼ ((α→d β) ∨ γ)→d (α ∧d ∼ (β ∨ γ))
D19 ∼ ((α ∧d β) ∨ γ)→d (α→d ∼ (β ∨ γ))
D20 ∼ (∼ (α ∨ β) ∨ γ)→d (∼ (∼α ∨ γ) ∨∼ (∼β ∨ γ))
D21 ∼ (∼ (α→d β) ∨ γ)→d (α→d ∼ (∼β ∨ γ))
D22 ∼ (∼ (α ∧d β) ∨ γ)→d (α ∧d ∼ (∼ β ∨ γ))
We now turn to Ciuciura’s axiomatization.
C1 α→d (β →d α)
C2 (α→d (β →d γ))→d ((α→d β)→d (α→d γ))
C3 (α ∧d β)→d α
C4 (α ∧d β)→d β
C5 α→d (β →d (α ∧d β))
C6 α→d (α ∨ β)
C7 β →d (α ∨ β)
C8 (α→d γ)→d ((β →d γ)→d (α ∨ β)→d γ)
C9 α ∨ (α→d β)
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C10 ∼ (∼α ∧d ∼∼α ∧d ∼ (α ∨ ∼α))
C11 ∼ (∼α ∧d ∼β ∧d ∼ (α ∨ β))→d ∼ (∼α ∧d ∼β ∧d ∼ γ ∧d ∼ (α ∨ β ∨ γ))
C12 ∼ (∼α ∧d ∼β ∧d ∼ γ ∧d ∼ (α ∨ β ∨ γ))→d ∼ (∼α ∧d ∼ γ ∧d ∼β ∧d ∼ (α ∨ γ ∨ β))
C13 ∼ (∼α ∧d ∼β ∧d ∼ γ ∧d ∼ (α ∨ β ∨ γ))→d ((α ∨ β ∨ ∼ γ)→d (α ∨ β))
C14 ∼ (∼α ∧d ∼β)→d (α ∨ β)
C15 (α ∨ (β ∨ ∼β))→d ∼ (∼α ∧d ∼ (β ∨ ∼β))
2. Non-equivalence of the axiomatizations
Section 2.1 lists the axioms of D that are unprovable in C and Section 2.3
lists the axioms of C that are unprovable in D. It is clear that C and D
share theorems, since some of the axioms of the two (e.g., C1 and D1) are
identical. Thus, we are in possession of two “orthogonal” logics: they overlap
but neither theory includes the other.
2.1. Theorems of D unprovable in C
Ciuciura points out that D19 and D22 are invalid in the intended semantics of
D2. Since Ciuciura’s C is intended to be sound and complete for the intended
semantics, it is clear that neither D19 nor D22 ought to be theorems of C. It
is worth, however, investigating this from an axiomatic point of view, that
is, without referring to the intended semantics. Moreover, it is worth asking
whether there might be other theorems of D that are unprovable in C. Are
D19 and D22 the only ones? The answer, made clear in the following series
of Propositions, is a resounding “no”. Briefly, all of D10 to D22, save for D11,
are unprovable in C.
Proposition 2.1. 6⊢C D10
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 1) over the three truth val-
ues {1, 2, 3} for →d, ∧d, ∨, and ∼:
We then declare that any formula having the values 1 or 3 according to
these tables is provable; formulas having value 2 are unprovable.
Proposition 2.2. 6⊢C D12
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 2): We then declare that any
formula having the values 2, 3, or 4 according to these tables is provable;
formulas having value 1 declared to be unprovable.
Proposition 2.3. 6⊢C D13
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Value Value of ∼
1 3
2 3
3 2
Value Value ∨ ∧d →d
1 1 3 3 3
1 2 1 2 2
1 3 3 1 3
2 1 1 2 3
2 2 2 2 1
2 3 3 2 2
3 1 3 1 1
3 2 3 2 2
3 3 3 3 3
Table 1. Matrices validating C in which D10 is invalid
Value Value of ∼
1 4
2 3
3 4
4 1
Value Value ∨ ∧d →d
1 1 1 1 4
1 2 2 1 2
1 3 3 1 2
1 4 4 1 4
2 1 2 1 1
2 2 2 3 3
2 3 2 4 3
2 4 2 4 3
3 1 3 1 1
3 2 3 3 4
3 3 3 2 4
3 4 4 2 3
4 1 4 1 1
4 2 4 4 2
4 3 4 3 3
4 4 4 4 3
Table 2. Matrices validating C in which D12 is invalid
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 3): We then declare that
any formula having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable;
formulas having value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
Proposition 2.4. 6⊢C D14
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 4): We then declare that
any formula having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable;
formulas having value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
Proposition 2.5. 6⊢C D15
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 5): The matrix for negation
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Value Value of ∼
1 3
2 2
3 1
Value Value ∨ ∧d →d
1 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 1 1
1 3 1 3 3
2 1 2 2 1
2 2 1 2 1
2 3 2 3 3
3 1 1 3 1
3 2 2 3 1
3 3 3 3 1
Table 3. Matrices validating C in which D13 is invalid
Value Value of ∼
1 3
2 1
3 1
Value Value ∨ ∧d →d
1 1 2 1 1
1 2 2 1 1
1 3 1 3 3
2 1 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
2 3 2 3 3
3 1 1 3 1
3 2 2 3 1
3 3 3 3 1
Table 4. Matrices validating C in which D14 is invalid
is the same as the one appearing in Table 1. We then declare that any for-
mula having the values 1 or 3 according to these tables is provable; formulas
having value 2 are declared to be unprovable.
Proposition 2.6. 6⊢C D16
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 6): We then declare that any
formula having the values 2, 3, or 4 according to these tables is provable;
formulas having value 1 declared to be unprovable.
Proposition 2.7. 6⊢C D17
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 7): The matrix for negation
is the same as the one used in Table 3. We then declare that any formula
having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable; formulas having
value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
Proposition 2.8. 6⊢C D18
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 8): We then declare that
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Value Value ∨ ∧d →d
1 1 3 1 1
1 2 1 2 2
1 3 3 1 3
2 1 1 2 3
2 2 2 2 1
2 3 3 2 3
3 1 1 3 1
3 2 3 2 2
3 3 1 3 3
Table 5. Matrices validating C in which D15 is invalid.
Value Value of ∼
1 3
2 2
3 1
4 4
Value Value ∨ ∧d →d
1 1 1 1 4
1 2 2 1 2
1 3 4 1 2
1 4 4 1 2
2 1 3 1 1
2 2 4 2 4
2 3 3 2 2
2 4 2 4 2
3 1 4 1 1
3 2 3 3 2
3 3 3 3 2
3 4 2 2 4
4 1 4 1 1
4 2 2 2 4
4 3 4 2 3
4 4 4 2 3
Table 6. Matrices validating C in which D16 is invalid
any formula having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable;
formulas having value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
Proposition 2.9. 6⊢C D19
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 9): We then declare that
any formula having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable;
formulas having value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
Proposition 2.10. 6⊢C D20
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 10): We then declare that
any formula having the values 2 or 3 according to these tables is provable;
formulas having value 1 are declared to be unprovable.
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Value Value ∨ ∧d →d
1 1 2 1 1
1 2 1 1 1
1 3 1 3 3
2 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 2 1
2 3 2 3 3
3 1 1 3 2
3 2 2 3 1
3 3 3 3 1
Table 7. Matrices validating C in which D17 is invalid
Value Value ∨ ∧d →d
1 1 2 1 1
1 2 2 2 1
1 3 1 3 3
2 1 1 2 1
2 2 1 1 1
2 3 2 3 3
3 1 1 3 2
3 2 2 3 2
3 3 3 3 2
Table 8. Matrices validating C in which D18 is invalid. The matrix for negation is the
same as the one appearing in Table 4.
Proposition 2.11. 6⊢C D21
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 11): We then declare that
any formula having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable;
formulas having value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
Proposition 2.12. 6⊢C D22
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 12): We then declare that
any formula having the values 1 or 2 according to these tables is provable;
formulas having value 3 are declared to be unprovable.
2.2. S5-(in)validities among the D axioms
Section 2.1 presents several axiom (schemes) of D cannot be proved in C
(that is, for each of several of D’s axiom schemes, at least one instance of
the scheme is not provable in C). As pointed out by Ciuciura, the fact
that some of these theorems are invalid according to the intended semantics
shows that their C-unprovability is to be expected (with the understanding,
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Value Value ∨ ∧d →d
1 1 2 1 1
1 2 2 1 1
1 3 1 3 3
2 1 1 2 2
2 2 1 2 2
2 3 2 3 3
3 1 1 3 2
3 2 2 3 1
3 3 3 3 1
Table 9. Matrices validating C in which D19 is invalid. The matrix for negation is the
same as the one appearing in Table 4.
Value Value of ∼
1 3
2 3
3 1
Value Value ∨ ∧d →d
1 1 1 1 2
1 2 2 1 3
1 3 3 1 2
2 1 2 1 1
2 2 3 2 3
2 3 3 2 2
3 1 3 1 1
3 2 3 2 2
3 3 2 3 2
Table 10. Matrices validating C in which D20 is invalid
of course, that C is supposed to be an axiomatization of D2). But it is
too quick to conclude that this diagnosis applies to all of the C-unprovable
axioms of D. Indeed, some of sentences appearing in Proposition 2.1–2.12
are in fact valid in the intended semantics of D2. Table 13 separates the
two.
Proposition 2.13. If φ and ψ are S5-valid formulas such that φ ↔ ψ is a
tautology, then ♦(♦φ→ ψ) is S5-valid.
Proof. Consider an S5-model M = (W,R, V ) (a triple of a non-empty
set of worlds, an equivalence relation, and a function from atoms to sets of
worlds) and a world w in W . If u 2 ψ for every world u accessible from w,
then (since R is reflexive) we have
w  ♦(♦φ→ ψ)
trivially. Suppose, then, that u is a world accessible from w for which u  ψ.
Then, since φ ↔ ψ is a tautology, u  φ as well. Since R is reflexive, we
have that u  ♦φ as well as u  ♦φ→ ψ. Thus
w  ♦(♦φ→ ψ)
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Value Value ∨ ∧d →d
1 1 2 1 2
1 2 2 1 1
1 3 1 3 3
2 1 2 1 2
2 2 1 2 1
2 3 2 3 3
3 1 1 3 2
3 2 2 3 1
3 3 3 3 2
Table 11. Matrices validating C in which D21 is invalid. The matrix for negation is the
same as the one appearing in Table 3.
Value Value ∨ ∧d →d
1 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1
1 3 1 3 3
2 1 1 1 2
2 2 1 1 1
2 3 2 3 3
3 1 1 3 2
3 2 2 3 1
3 3 3 3 2
Table 12. Matrices validating C in which D22 is invalid. The matrix for negation is the
same as the one appearing in Table 3.
as desired.
The standard translation τ from D2-formulas (the connectives are ∼, ∨
as well as →d and ∧d), to standard (non-discussive) modal formulas (built
from atoms and the usual battery ∼, →, ∨, ∧) is standardly defined as not
changing ∨ and ∼. Proposition 2.13 thus yields:
Corollary 2.14. If D2-formulas φ and ψ contain neither →d nor ∧d (that
is, both are built from atoms and ∨ and ∼ alone), and if φ↔ ψ is a tautology,
then φ→d ψ is D2-valid.
Proof. φ →d ψ is D2-valid just in case τ(φ→d ψ) is S5-valid. Since the
discussive connectives ∧d and →d appear neither in φ nor in ψ, we are to
prove that
♦(♦φ→ ψ)
is S5-valid. This follows from Proposition 2.13.
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D-axiom D2-valid?
D10 +
D12 -
D13 -
D14 -
D15 +
D16 -
D17 +
D18 ?
D19 -
D20 +
D21 ?
D22 -
Table 13. S5 validities and invalidities among the D axioms. “?” indicates that we were
unable to settle the validity question, owing to the complexity of the (translated) formulas.
The corollary allows us to quickly identify D10, D15, D17, and D20 as D2-
valid, since these formulas are discussive implications whose antecedents and
consequents are do not involve the→d and ∧d connectives. For example, D10
is dispatched because α and ∼∼α are tautologically equivalent. D18 and
D21 are not covered by the corollary, since their antecedents and consequents
involve discussive connectives.
2.3. Theorems of C unprovable in D
(The following section is a digression from the main line of investigation but
is included for the sake of completeness.)
Section 2.1 lists many axioms of D that are unprovable in D. Ciuciura
singled out D19 and D22 as invalid in the intended semantics for D2, and
thus ought to be missing from an axiomatization. One might suspect that
the way out is to restrict D: throw out the axioms that are not valid in
the intended semantics, but keep the rest (possibly reformulated in a more
perspicuous way). On this line of reasoning, one expects to find that every
axiom of C is provable in D (though one hopes that the axioms D19 and
D22 singled out by Ciuciura are avoided). But this is not so: one finds that
Ciuciura’s axiomatization C is not simply a restriction of D. It turns out
that (at least) one axiom of C is unprovable in D.
Proposition 2.15. 6⊢D C13
Proof. Consider the following matrices (Table 14): We then declare that
any formula having the values 2, 3, or 4 according to these tables is provable;
formulas having value 1 declared to be unprovable.
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Value Value of ∼
1 2
2 1
3 4
4 3
Value Value ∨ ∧d →d
1 1 1 1 2
1 2 2 1 2
1 3 3 1 2
1 4 4 1 2
2 1 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
2 3 2 3 3
2 4 2 4 4
3 1 3 1 1
3 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3
3 4 2 4 4
4 1 4 1 1
4 2 2 2 2
4 3 2 3 3
4 4 4 4 4
Table 14. Matrices validating D in which C13 is invalid
3. Conclusion and further problems
In light of the results of Section 2, it would appear that the Ciuciura’s
completeness theorem (Theorem 4.3 of [2]) is mistaken. We thus seem to
lack a complete axiomatization of D2. More accurately, neither C nor D is a
complete axiomatization of D2. Other axiomatizations, such Vasyukov’s [5],
deserves to be compared to C and D. It is correct to point out that some of
the non-theorems of D are indeed not valid in the intended semantics, so they
ought not to be added to C. However, some D-theorems that are unprovable
in C, such as D10 and D11, are indeed valid in the intended semantics for D2.
It would thus appear that the challenge of axiomatizing D2 remains open.
The most problematic formulas are those which (i) are valid in the intended
semantics for D2 but which (ii) are not theorems of C. These are collected
in Table 13. Does one obtain an axiomatization of D2 by imply adding these
to C?
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